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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING THE USE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA: FLASH MOB PROTESTS WARRANT FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
Michael J. Fitzpatrick* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Flash mobs are a phenomenon that has recently gained 
significant popularity among entertainers and activists alike.  
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a flash mob is 
comprised of “a group of people summoned (as by e-mail or text 
message) to a designated location at a specified time to perform an 
indicated action before dispersing.”1  As its definition suggests, flash 
mobs are intrinsically linked to social media.2  This association is 
primarily a result of flash mobbers’ reliance on text messaging and 
other social-networking technology to both organize and rally 
support for their particular cause or performance.3  Additionally, 
social media technology plays an important role during the 
commission of a flash mob.4  Social networks enable flash mobbers to 
instantaneously communicate with one another, thereby empowering 
participants to immediately change venue, or, in some instances, 
evade authorities.5 
Generally, flash mobs are associated with amusing performance 
acts that take place in highly public areas, such as train stations, 
parks, or town squares.6  Such an association is understandable, as 
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 1  Flash Mob Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/flash%20mob (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
 2  See id. 
 3  J. David Goodman, Debate Over Social Media Incitement as Flash Mobs Strike, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/17 
/debate-over-social-media-incitement-as-flash-mobs-strike/?scp=1&sq=Flash%20Mob 
&st=cse. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Sheila Shayon, Flash Mob Trend Spawns A New Social Media Industry, Social Media, 
BRANDCHANNEL.COM (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post 
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flash mobs were initially used almost exclusively for entertainment 
purposes, with large groups of performers organizing spontaneous 
choreographed dances, songs, and other performances in public 
areas.7  In reality, however, flash mobs encompass a much broader 
range of activities.8  Despite flash mobs’ innocuous beginnings, their 
scope of use has evolved, as flash mobs are now utilized for more 
substantial and substantive purposes.9  In fact, flash mobs have been 
linked to acts of crime, violence, and public disorder.10  For example, 
in 2011 alone, flash mobs were linked to a protest in San Francisco, 
riots in both Philadelphia and London, and robberies in Maryland.11 
As flash mobs are increasingly utilized for more sinister 
purposes, a debate has emerged regarding how flash mobs should be 
regulated and whether such regulations unconstitutionally impinge 
upon participants’ First Amendment rights.12  Perhaps the most 
controversial issue surrounding this debate concerns governmental 
regulation of flash mobbers’ systematic usage of social media.13  On 
the one hand, police forces and other governmental authorities 
argue that violent flash mobs are a byproduct of flash mobbers’ 
pervasive use of “social media . . . like Twitter and Facebook and 
instant messaging services . . . [as] organizing tools for mayhem.”14  
Because flash mob participants rely on social media to recruit, 
 
/2011/08/23/Flash-Mob-Trend-Spawns-A-New-Social-Media-Industry.aspx. 
 7  See, e.g., ShareATT, AT&T Network TV Commercial—Flash Mob, YOUTUBE (May 
9, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd8ppk0UCx8 (showing a television 
commercial of a planned flash mob dance at a train station.  This clip also displays 
flash mobs’ close relationship to social media, albeit in a humorous fashion); 
CulturePub, Historic Flashmob in Antwerp Train Station, Do Re Mi, YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQLCZOG202k (video of a 
choreographed flash mob dance in an Antwerp train station); ImprovEverywhere, 
Improv Everywhere: Frozen Grand Central, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwMj3PJDxuo&ob=av3e (showing a flash mob 
performance where hundreds of people spontaneously froze in Grand Central 
Station, New York City.  This video also shows how flash mobs can disrupt station 
activities); discoverireland, St Patrick’s Day Flashmob in Sydney by Tourism Ireland, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxEB48jY3F8 
(depicting a choreographed flash mob dance in Central Station, Sydney, Australia). 
 8  Shayon, supra note 6. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Justin Silverman, BART Phone Blackout: Did the S.F. Transit Agency Violate Free 
Speech Protections, SUFFOLK MEDIA LAW (Aug. 27, 2011), http://suffolkmedialaw.com 
/2011/08/27/bart-phone-blackout-did-the-s-f-transit-agency-violate-free-speech 
-protections/. 
 13  Goodman, supra note 3. 
 14  Id. 
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support, and evade authorities, government officials maintain that 
they can more easily suppress flash mobs by restricting mobbers’ 
access to social media.15  In contrast, proponents of flash mobs and 
free speech activists believe that “social media doesn’t organize riots.  
People organize riots.”16  Following this logic, violent flash mobs are 
born out of violent people rather than social media.17  As a result, 
activists argue that restricting a flash mob’s usage of social media 
violates the First Amendment by censoring expressive speech in a 
protected forum.18 
Possibly the most indicative manifestation of this debate 
occurred on August 11, 2011, when the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART), which is the San Francisco public subway system authority, 
completely shut down cell phone and wireless service (the “wireless 
network”) to their train platforms to prevent a planned flash mob 
protest.19  This particular flash mob protest was in response to the 
BART Police Department’s (BART PD) July 3, 2011 shooting of 
Charles Hill, a homeless train passenger.20  Hill’s death sparked a 
massive public outcry against BART PD, with protestors vigorously 
demanding that BART PD be reformed and/or disbanded due to its 
violent track record.21  On July 11, 2011, protestors flooded BART’s 
Civic Center Station to voice their outrage with the shooting.22  The 
protest primarily took place on BART’s train platforms and resulted 
in substantial disturbances to BART’s train system.23  Due to the 
protest’s spontaneity, principle organization, and perpetuation 
through social media, it is characterized as a flash mob protest. 
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id.  
 17  See id. 
 18  Silverman, supra note 12. 
 19  Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse ‘Flash’ Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service.  Is that 
Legal?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com 
/USA/Justice/2011/0812/To-defuse-flash-protest-BART-cuts-riders-cell-service.-Is 
-that-legal. 
 20  Id.; see also Maria L. La Ganga & Lee Romney, Protest Closes 4 BART Stations, 
Leaving Commuter Crowd Stranded, LA TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/15/local/la-me-bart-anonymous-protest 
-20110816. 
 21  La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20.  BART faced a similar public reaction 
after a BART officer shot an unarmed passenger in 2009.  Zusha Elinson & Shoshana 
Walter, Latest BART Shooting Prompts New Discussion of Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/us/17bcbart.html. 
 22  Silverman, supra note 12. 
 23  Id. (reporting that the July 11 flash mob caused congestion on BART 
platforms, several train delays, and the partial and complete shutdown of various 
BART stations). 
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One month later, BART officials learned of a similar flash mob 
protest scheduled for August 11.24  To ensure passenger safety and 
prevent similar disturbances to the July 11 protest, BART officials 
preemptively disabled BART’s train platforms’ wireless networks.25  
Perhaps due to the integral role that social networking plays in 
organizing and sustaining flash mob protests, no protest took place 
on August 11.26  This unprecedented tactic in shutting down wireless 
service provoked an enormous reaction from protestors and free 
speech activists alike, who believed that the shutdown 
unconstitutionally violated protestors’ First Amendment right to free 
speech.27  Consequently, activists promised to continue to protest at 
BART stations until BART decided to “back away from their policy of 
cellphone [sic] censorship.”28 
This Comment will investigate the constitutionality of regulating 
flash mob protests via social media restrictions.  This analysis will 
examine the relevant issues and law associated with such regulations 
and will demonstrate how the law should be applied practically, using 
the BART wireless network shutdown as a case study. 
Part II will begin by exploring whether a flash mob can qualify as 
expressive speech and thereby receive First Amendment protection.  
This section will analyze both the communicative and non-
communicative elements of flash mobs, which are crucial to 
determining whether a flash mob is within the purview of the First 
Amendment.  Additionally, Part II will investigate, and diffuse, the 
allegation that a flash mob protest’s use of social media frequently 
constitutes incitement, which is defined as unprotected speech that 
advocates for, and is likely to produce, imminent lawless action.29  
Part III will conduct a forum analysis to determine (1) what forums 
are implicated by flash mob protests, and (2) the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny applied to such forums.  This analysis is crucial, as 
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and 
at all times.”30  Part IV will consider whether preemptive access 
restrictions to social media networks constitute prior restraints on 
expressive speech, which carry a “heavy presumption against [their] 
 
 24  Jonsson, supra note 19. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Zusha Elinson, After Cellphone Action, BART Faces Escalating Protests, U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/us/21bcbart 
.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=BART&st=cse. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 30  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). 
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constitutional validity.”31  In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court 
held that if speech is to be punished, it may only be punished after 
the speaker has spoken.32  Because prior restraints are among the 
most heinous restrictions on speech, the governmental justification 
for such a restraint must fulfill a very stringent three-part test.33 
Immediately following each part, this Comment will apply the 
relevant issues and law to the BART situation.  Ultimately, after 
thoroughly analyzing all germane factors and circumstances, and 
responding to all relevant counter-arguments, these portions will 
demonstrate that social media regulations are subject to the highest 
judicial scrutiny, and, as a result, BART’s wireless network shutdown 
unconstitutionally censored protected speech. 
Finally, Part V will synthesize each preceding part and conclude 
that although the constitutionality of flash mob regulations must be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, completely restricting a flash mob’s 
use of social media technology generally results in a First 
Amendment violation.  In sum, this Comment will argue that 
provided a flash mob protest intends to communicate a 
constitutionally protected message that is likely to be understood, 
courts should strike down preemptive wireless and social media 
restrictions as unconstitutional. 
II.  WHEN DO FLASH MOB PROTESTS CONSTITUTE PROTECTED SPEECH? 
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that First 
Amendment protections do not “end at the spoken or written 
word.”34  Consequently, expressive conduct may receive First 
Amendment protections.35  Accordingly, flash mobs that are intended 
to convey communicative expression meet the first criterion for 
constitutional protection. 
A.  Expressive Conduct and the O’Brien Test 
In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e 
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct 
can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the 
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”36  As a result, even when 
 
 31  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976). 
 34  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
 35  See id. 
 36  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see generally James M. 
McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1 
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conduct expresses an idea or opinion, it does not automatically 
receive the full protection of the First Amendment.37  Moreover, to 
receive any First Amendment protection, the expressive conduct 
must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication . . . .”38  
To determine whether conduct is sufficiently communicative, the 
Supreme Court has asked whether “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”39  
Therefore, expressive conduct must be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis.40 
Using this rationale, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the following conduct is sufficiently expressive and qualifies for First 
Amendment protection: the wearing of black armbands to protest the 
Vietnam War,41 sit-ins against segregation,42 and “picketing about a 
wide variety of causes.”43 
In contrast to protected spoken and written speech, the 
government has more freedom to restrict protected expressive 
conduct.44  This speech receives less protection because expressive 
conduct is usually comprised of both “speech and nonspeech” 
elements.45  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that “when 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course 
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
 
(2008). 
 37  See id. 
 38  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 
(1974)). 
 39  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410). 
 40  This is an important consideration.  Although one flash mob may be deemed 
protected expressive conduct, this does not mean that all flash mobs are protected 
expressive conduct.  For example, a flash mob protesting for a particular cause will 
more than likely be deemed communicative in nature.  In contrast, a flash mob 
robbery, where the participants spontaneously loot a store in an effort to steal and 
evade police, certainly is not communicative in any way.  Therefore, regardless of 
what conclusions are drawn about the BART flash mob protest, such conclusions are 
not indicative of how all flash mob protests should be treated. 
 41  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
 42  Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966). 
 43  See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (finding that “[t]here 
is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressing 
activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment”); Amalgamated Food 
Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that 
picketing, which carries both elements of speech and conduct, that is “carried on in 
a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose 
or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment”). 
 44  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
 45  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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regulating the nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”46  As a result, to restrict expressive conduct 
the government must prove that: (1) its regulation is within the 
government’s constitutional powers; (2) the regulation serves an 
“important or substantial governmental interest”; (3) the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of a particular 
idea or opinion; and (4) the regulation is not “greater than is 
essential” to further such an interest.47  In Johnson, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that a restriction or regulation may not “proscribe 
particular conduct because it has expressive elements.”48 
The O’Brien case effectively illustrates how to apply this test.  In 
O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that a statute that punished the 
defendant for destroying his draft card did not violate the First 
Amendment because the statute merely condemned the 
“noncommunicative aspect of [his] conduct.”49  The defendant, who 
set his draft card on fire to display his anti-war sentiment, argued that 
the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon his right to freely 
express his opposition to the war and the draft.50  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, concluding that the government had a 
substantial interest in preventing harm to “the smooth and efficient 
functioning of the Selective Service System,” which required each 
draftee to have and preserve their draft certificates.51  Thus, when the 
defendant destroyed his certificate, he frustrated a substantial 
governmental interest.52  As a result, the defendant was held 
accountable for the noncommunicative impact of his conduct—
frustrating the Selective Service System—rather than his display of 
anti-war sentiment.53  Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the government had a “substantial interest in assuring the continuing 
availability of issued Selective Service certificates,” and the challenged 
statute narrowly protected this interest by only condemning the 
noncommunicative elements of divergent conduct.54  In addition, the 
 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”). 
 48  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (emphasis in original). 
 49  O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82. 
 50  Id. at 381. 
 51  Id. at 382. 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. at 381. 
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Supreme Court held that the defendant frustrated the government’s 
interest by burning his draft card, and that the statute only 
incidentally limited the defendant’s expression.55 
In the context of flash mobs, the O’Brien test reveals an 
important consideration: flash mobs must be considered on a case-by-
case basis.  For instance, a flash mob robbery, which entails numerous 
people spontaneously looting a particular store or neighborhood, 
certainly is not imbued with any communicative elements.56  Flash 
mob protests, on the other hand, almost always intend to 
communicate a message.  Despite this, each flash mob protest must 
be individually analyzed to ascertain whether the protest’s message is 
likely to be understood, whether the government has a significant 
interest in regulating the noncommunicative elements of the protest, 
and whether the government furthers that interest in a fashion that 
only incidentally limits the protesters’ expression. 
B.  Incitement 
Many opponents to flash mobs argue that flash mobbers use 
social media to incite imminent lawless action.57  To explore this 
issue, it is essential to understand that the right to free speech “is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”58  In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court stated, “there are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problems.”59  Among these unprotected classes of 
speech are incitement,60 fighting words,61 libel,62 and obscenity.63  
Thus, by arguing that flash mob protests constitute incitement, 
opponents of flash mobs are espousing the belief that flash mobs, 
and their use of social media, may be freely restricted and regulated 
 
 55   United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
 56  Shayon, supra note 6. 
 57  Silverman, supra note 12. 
 58  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 59  Id. at 371–72. 
 60  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 61  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (ruling fighting words, or “those 
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a 
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction,” may 
be freely banned without “a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances”). 
 62  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (finding that printing a 
libelous publication about a citizen, who is not a public official, is not protected by 
the Constitution). 
 63  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (holding that patently offensive 
sexual and excretory speech is not protected by the First Amendment). 
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by governmental authorities.64 
The seminal case regarding incitement is Schenck v. United 
States.65  In Schenck, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Espionage Act—a World War I statute that 
proscribed speech that attempted to obstruct the wartime draft and 
“cause insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United 
States.”66  Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were indicted under 
the Espionage Act for printing and distributing a pamphlet that 
advocated for enlisted men and drafted men to forsake their duty to 
the United States Army.67  Schenck and Baer argued that the 
Espionage Act unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment 
because the Act discriminatorily punished actions based on their 
viewpoint.68 
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that “the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
done.”69  As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that when words 
create a clear and present danger to the public, those words are not 
afforded constitutional protection.70  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court stated in dicta that wartime speech is much more likely to 
create a clear and present danger; therefore, such speech is not 
afforded as much protection as speech during peacetime.71  
Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the Espionage Act 
did not violate the First Amendment because speech intended to 
disrupt military recruitment likely creates a clear and present danger 
to military conscription.72 
Although the clear and present danger doctrine was 
progressively weakened over time, it governed incitement for nearly 
fifty years.73  In 1969, however, the Supreme Court abrogated the 
clear and present danger test with the Brandenburg v. Ohio ruling.74  In 
 
 64  Silverman, supra note 12. 
 65  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 66  Id. at 48–49. 
 67  Id. at 49, 51. 
 68  Id. at 51. 
 69  Id. at 52. 
 70  Id. (emphasis added). 
 71  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 72  Id. at 53. 
 73  See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (holding that mere 
advocacy of a forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract principle does not 
violate the clear and present danger test); see also Andrianna D. Kastanek, From Hit 
Man to a Military Takeover of New York City: The Evolving Effects of Rice Paladin Enterprises 
on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 386–94 (2004). 
 74  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444 (1969). 
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Brandenburg, the Supreme Court considered whether the leader of 
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) First Amendment rights were 
unconstitutionally infringed when he was convicted under the Ohio 
Criminal Syndicalism statute.75  This statute restricted speech that 
advocated for “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, 
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform.”76  The KKK leader’s 
conviction was based on his fanatical speech that lobbied for the KKK 
to take “revengent” action against the government and for KKK 
sympathizers to march upon Congress.77  In addition, numerous 
members of the audience held firearms and burned crosses.78 
Rather than apply the clear and present danger standard, the 
Supreme Court adopted a new test, concluding that the 
“constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and it is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”79  Consequently, the Supreme Court introduced a much 
stricter, two-pronged standard.80  Under the Brandenburg test, inciting 
speech must advocate for lawless action that is (1) imminent and (2) 
likely to occur.81  Applying this standard to the facts, the Supreme 
Court found that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act was 
unconstitutional because the statute punished “mere advocacy.”82 
This standard draws a distinction between mere advocacy and 
preparation.83  In Noto v. United States, the Supreme Court 
distinguished “preparing a group for violent action” from abstractly 
teaching that violence is a moral propriety or necessity.84  As a result, 
a speaker’s advocacy or encouragement of violent tactics does not 
constitute imminent lawless action unless such advocacy can be 
 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. at 444–45. 
 77  Id. at 445–47. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 447 (emphasis added); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (Black, J., 
concurring) (finding that the clear and present danger test should be abrogated 
because it has been “manipulated to crush what [Justice] Brandeis called ‘[t]he 
fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation 
and new institutions’ by argument and discourse even in times of war”) (quoting 
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1947) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 80  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. at 449. 
 83  Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1960). 
 84  Id. 
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considered preparation, which arises when it is reasonably certain 
that lawless or violent action will occur.85  According to the Supreme 
Court, “to rule otherwise would ignore the ‘profound national 
commitment’ that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.’”86 
Proper application of the Brandenburg doctrine requires an 
understanding of the term “lawless action.”  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, “lawless action” under the Brandenburg doctrine is 
distinguishable from “civil disobedience.”87  In White v. Lee, the Ninth 
Circuit held that 
“[i]mminent lawless action,” as used in Brandenburg, means 
violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot.  
Peaceful speech, even speech that urges civil disobedience, 
is fully protected by the First Amendment.  Were this not 
the case, the right of Americans to speak out peacefully on 
issues and to petition their government would be sharply 
circumscribed.88 
Although White draws a distinction between lawless action and 
civil disobedience, the difference between “physical disorder in the 
nature of a riot” and civil disobedience remains unclear.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary clarifies this ambiguity, defining civil disobedience as “a 
deliberate but nonviolent act of lawbreaking to call attention to a 
particular law or set of laws believed by the actor to be of 
questionable legitimacy or morality.”89  Therefore, civil disobedience 
does not qualify as lawless action merely because violations of law 
occur.90  Rather, the crux of civil disobedience is the existence of a 
nonviolent act that calls attention to some alleged immorality.91  In 
contrast, Black’s defines the term riot—the nature of lawless action—
as “[a]n unlawful disturbance of the peace by an assemblage of three 
or more persons acting with a common purpose in a violent or 
tumultuous manner that threatens or terrorizes the public or an 
institution.”92  Thus, the primary difference between civil 
disobedience and a riot is violence and tumultuousness rather than 
 
 85  Id. 
 86  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). 
 87  White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 88  Id. 
 89  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (9th ed. 2009); see also ARCHIBALD COX, JR. ET 
AL., CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 169 (1968) (“Social protests 
and even civil disobedience serve the law’s need for growth.”). 
 90  See id. 
 91  See id. 
 92  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (9th ed. 2009). 
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illegality. 
As a result, under Brandenburg, “inciting speech” is speech that 
(1) is directed toward producing imminent lawless—or riotous—
action that (2) is likely to produce such action.  Thus, when applied 
to a flash mob protest’s use of social media, the most important 
inquiries are (1) what conduct or measures the speech is advocating 
for, and (2) whether such actions constitute lawless action or civil 
disobedience. 
C.  Application to BART 
1.  Did the Planned BART Flash Mob Protest Constitute 
Expressive Speech? 
To receive constitutional protection, the August 11 planned 
flash mob protest must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication . . . .”93  As such, the planned protest must be a 
vehicle for communicating a particular message.94  Additionally, it 
must be likely that this message will be “understood by those who 
viewed it.”95 
Applying these principles to BART, the BART flash mobbers 
intended to use the flash mob as a vehicle for expressing their 
opposition to BART PD’s violent reputation.96  In fact, the planned 
protest was part of a massive movement known as “No Justice, No 
BART,” which was organized to call the public’s attention to BART 
PD’s heinous and violent actions.97  Therefore, the flash mob protest 
was aimed at communicating a particularized message.  Furthermore, 
this message was likely to be understood by those who viewed it.  This 
is evident through the July 11 protest, which featured flash mobbers 
wearing bloody T-shirts to convey BART PD’s violent track record, 
numerous chants calling for the BART PD’s disbandment, and 
countless signs opposing violence against BART passengers like 
Charles Hill.98  Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized 
picketing as sufficiently expressive conduct.99  As a result, the planned 
 
 93  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Vivian Ho, BART: Next time, ‘zero tolerance’ for disruptions, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., July 13, 2011, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a 
/2011/07/13/BAP51K9JQR.DTL. 
 97  Id. 
 98  La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20. 
 99  See generally Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
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flash mob protest qualifies as expressive conduct that may receive 
First Amendment protection. 
Although the planned flash mob protest qualifies as protected 
expressive conduct, the government may nevertheless be entitled to 
restrict it.100  To begin this examination, it is important to note that 
the planned protest had both speech and nonspeech elements.101  
The speech elements encapsulated the protestors’ opposition to 
BART PD.  These elements were disseminated via the protestors 
picketing on train platforms as well as their posts on social 
networking forums like Facebook, Twitter, and even through text 
messaging and e-mail.102  The nonspeech elements, on the other 
hand, included causing delays to the BART system, causing 
temporary station closures, and, most importantly, endangering 
BART passengers’ and employees’ safety.103 
Next, the BART protest must be applied to the O’Brien test to 
determine whether it constitutes protected expressive speech.  The 
O’Brien test is comprised of four parts that consider whether: (1) the 
government regulation “is within the constitutional power of the 
Government”; (2) “it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest”; (3) “the government interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression”; and (4) the incidental restriction 
on “First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”104  If all four elements are satisfied then 
the government may regulate the flash mob protest.  BART’s actions 
likely fail the first prong of the O’Brien test because the regulation 
unconstitutionally restricts access to a traditional public forum—
BART’s wireless and social networks.105  This point, however, will be 
analyzed in greater detail in Part III.E.3 infra.106 
It is questionable whether BART satisfies the second prong of 
the O’Brien test.  While BART certainly has an important and 
substantial governmental interest in preserving passenger safety, it is 
arguable whether that interest is furthered by BART shutting down 
 
 100  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 101  Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 102  See Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1 (as its definition suggests, flash mobs are 
intrinsically linked to social media.  Social media is crucial to flash mobs in that it 
allows flash mobbers to organize and publicize their cause to enormous amounts of 
people). 
 103  See Elinson, supra note 27; Silverman, supra note 12; Ho, supra note 96. 
 104  O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82. 
 105  See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 
(1985).  
 106  See infra Part III.E.3. 
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the wireless network.  According to BART, the wireless network 
shutdown prevented congestion on the train platforms, thereby 
preserving passenger and personnel safety.107  In addition, BART was 
concerned that the flash mob would cause substantial train delays 
and station closures.108  As seen through the July 11 protest, these 
concerns were legitimate, and BART had an important interest in 
ensuring that they did not occur again.109  Despite this, the wireless 
network shutdown only marginally furthered that interest, if at all. 
According to an August 20, 2011 letter from BART officials to 
their passengers, BART dismantled wireless service because it 
received the following information: 
[Protestors] would be giving and receiving instructions to 
coordinate their activities via cell phone after their arrival 
on the train platforms at more than one station.  Individuals 
were instructed to text the location of police officers so that 
the organizers would be aware of officer locations and 
response times.  The overall information about the planned 
protest led BART to conclude that the planned action 
constituted a serious and imminent threat to the safety of 
BART passengers and personnel . . . .110 
As a result, the wireless shutdown would not be effective until after the 
protest had already begun, i.e., after the BART patrons and 
personnel were supposedly in danger.  Notwithstanding, a court 
would likely rule that the wireless network shutdown alone 
adequately advanced the government’s interest in public safety.  
Despite this, in addition to the wireless network shutdown, BART 
assigned over 120 extra uniformed police officers and operations 
personnel to their train stations in preparation of the flash mob.111  
Consequently, BART provided ample security to quickly and 
efficiently suppress the planned flash mob without the wireless 
network shutdown.  Ultimately, the shutdown was a superfluous 
restriction that was not needed to further the government’s interest 
in public safety.  As a result, the wireless network restriction is 
vulnerable to the O’Brien test’s second prong. 
BART easily satisfies the third prong of the O’Brien test as the 
 
 107  Letter from Bob Franklin, President, BART Bd. of Dirs., & Sherwood 
Wakeman, Interim Gen. Manager, to BART Customers (Aug. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx [hereinafter BART 
Letter]. 
 108  Id. 
 109  See Elinson, supra note 27; Ho, supra note 966. 
 110  See BART Letter, supra note 107. 
 111  Id. 
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shutdown was entirely unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.  If BART’s letter is accepted as true, its sole motivation for 
the wireless shutdown was to preserve passenger and personnel 
safety.112  Consequently, BART implied that it would take similar 
preemptive action against any planned protest that could potentially 
endanger passenger or personnel safety regardless of its message.113  
Presumably, BART would have taken the same or similar actions if it 
learned of a planned flash mob defending BART PD.  As a result, 
BART’s wireless shutdown was likely unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech. 
As to O’Brien’s fourth and final prong, BART likely cannot carry 
its burden.  To satisfy the last prong of the O’Brien test, an incidental 
restriction on First Amendment freedoms may not be “greater than is 
essential” to further the government’s interest.114  In the instant 
situation, the amount of expression BART censored via its wireless 
network shutdown substantially outweighed BART’s interest in 
furthering public safety.  To illustrate, BART denied every individual 
on its platforms access to BART’s wireless and social networks 
regardless of whether the individual intended to participate in the 
protest.115  As a result, BART censored an enormous amount of 
expression, as all individuals on the platform were prevented from 
calling, texting, tweeting, posting, or communicating in any way with 
people outside the platform areas.  Furthermore, BART’s bolstered 
security diluted the wireless network shutdown’s safety benefits.116  
Consequently, while the shutdown censored a massive amount of 
expression, it only marginally furthered BART’s public safety interest.  
Thus, the restriction had more than an incidental effect on protected 
expression, thereby failing O’Brien’s final prong. 
Ultimately, BART’s conduct does not have a very good chance of 
passing the O’Brien test.  Thus, the planned flash mob likely 
constituted protected expressive conduct under the First 
Amendment. 
2.  Can the Planned Protest be Characterized as 
Incitement? 
Under the Brandenburg test, the BART flash mob protest and, 
more specifically, the protestors’ use of social media, did not 
 
 112  Id. 
 113  See id. 
 114   United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 115  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 116  Id. 
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constitute inciting speech.  In BART’s August 20 letter to its 
passengers, BART officials claimed that it had obtained information 
that the protestors would be using their cell phones to coordinate the 
protest once on BART’s train platforms.117  Moreover, BART believed 
that such individuals were instructed to communicate the location of 
police officers and their response times to perpetuate the 
demonstration.118  This information led BART to conclude that the 
planned protest constituted a “serious and imminent threat to the 
safety of BART passengers and personnel and the safe operation of 
the BART system . . . .”119  This explanation, however, does not satisfy 
the Brandenburg test because the protestors’ speech advocated for civil 
disobedience rather than imminent lawless action. 
The BART flash mobbers used social media, such as Facebook, 
to organize and advocate for the August 11 planned protest at 
BART’s train stations.120  In fact, a group known as “No Justice, No 
Bart” created a Facebook page to recruit and organize support for 
the August 11 flash mob protest.121  Additionally, it is reasonable to 
assume that this advocacy was likely to result in a protest on August 
11.  Despite this, the message that the protestors disseminated and 
the actions that they advocated for were neither directed at, nor likely 
to produce, imminent lawless action as defined by the Brandenburg 
doctrine and the Ninth Circuit. 
First, BART protestors were advocating for the reform and/or 
the disbandment of BART PD and not for imminent lawless action.122  
The protestors’ speech was directed at effecting change by calling the 
public’s attention to BART PD’s questionable tactics and 
unrestrained use of deadly force.123  In response, BART would likely 
argue that the protestors encouraged the use of illegal means to 
accomplish this goal, thereby bringing the speech within the ambit of 
lawless action.  This argument, however, is without merit because, as 
the Ninth Circuit held in White, illegality does not necessarily imply 
 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Andrew Dalton, Group Demanding BART Police Be Disbanded Might Be Disbanded 
by BART Police, SFIST.COM (July 11, 2011), http://sfist.com/2011/07/11/group 
_demanding_bart_police_be_disb.php. 
 121  Id. 
 122  See id.; La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20. 
 123  See La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20 (reporting that protestors chanted, 
“No justice, no peace!  Disband the BART police!” in response to the BART police 
shooting of Charles Hill). 
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lawless action.124  BART’s trepidations about the August 11 planned 
protest were largely based on the previous July 11 flash mob protest.125  
Although the July 11 flash mob protest was extremely disruptive, the 
protest itself did not rise to the level of tumultuous or violent.126  In 
fact, when asked about this protest, BART’s spokesman Linton 
Johnson acknowledged, “[n]obody was hurt.”127  In addition, news 
reports indicated that the protestors employed nonviolent tactics 
such as picketing, chanting, and blocking access to trains.128  As a 
result, although the protestors’ tactics can be appropriately 
characterized as law-breaking, breaking the law—albeit in a peaceful 
manner—is a key characteristic of civil disobedience.129  Therefore, 
the planned August 11 flash mob protest likely would have resulted in 
civil disobedience as opposed to lawless action. 
Ultimately, based on the previous flash mob protest, BART had 
no reason to believe that the August 11 protest would become 
tumultuous or violent.  Consequently, the August 11 planned protest 
was comparable to civil disobedience and was not likely to incite or 
produce imminent lawless action as is required by the Brandenburg 
Doctrine. 
III.  FORUM ANALYSIS 
Although certain flash mob protests are considered protected 
speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that 
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and 
at all times.”130  As a result, to decide whether protected speech is 
permissible, a court must determine the type of forum that the 
speaker is attempting to access.131  This determination establishes 
whether “the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property 
to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use 
the property for other purposes.”132 This evaluation is crucial because 
the government is entitled to impose various limitations upon a 
speaker when his or her speech occurs on particular types of 
 
 124  White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 899. 
 125  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 126  See Ho, supra note 966. 
 127  Id. 
 128  See La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20. 
 129  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 899. 
 130  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). 
 131  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 132  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
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property.133  To facilitate this analysis, the Supreme Court has divided 
property into three distinct forums: (1) the traditional public forum; 
(2) the government-designated public forum; and (3) the nonpublic 
forum.134 
A.  The Traditional Public Forum 
Traditional public forums include streets, parks, and all other 
types of property that “have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes 
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.”135  As a result, the principal purpose of traditional 
public forums is the free exchange of ideas.136  Due to this historical 
commitment to free expression in traditional public forums, the 
government may not exclude speakers from these forums unless the 
exclusion serves a “compelling state interest and the exclusion is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”137  Despite this stringent 
standard, the government is entitled to enforce content-neutral time, 
place, and manner regulations on speech, provided those regulations 
are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”138 
In Arkansas Education Television Commission v. Forbes, the Supreme 
Court clarified what property qualifies as a traditional public forum 
by rejecting “the view that [the] traditional public forum status 
extends beyond [a property’s] historical confines.”139  As a result, the 
Court held that one must examine the history of a type of property to 
determine whether it qualifies as a traditional public forum.140  An 
example of the Court’s application of the historical confines standard 
 
 133  Perry, 460 U.S. at 44; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800 (“Nothing in the 
Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to 
exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without 
regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the 
speaker’s activities.”). 
 134  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
 135  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 
515 (1939)); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (ruling that “[t]raditional public fora 
are those places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
assembly and debate”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 136  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 137  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
 138  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 139  Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) 
(finding that public forums are those places that by definition are “open for 
expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.”  The Court also used the 
phrase “unfettered access” in describing the nature of a traditional public forum). 
 140  Id. 
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is seen in United States v. American Library Association, Inc., where the 
Supreme Court considered whether the Internet constitutes a 
traditional public forum.141  In American Library, the plaintiff 
challenged the constitutionality of implementing an Internet website 
filter in a public library.142  Applying the historical confines standard, 
the Court ruled that because Internet access did not exist until 
recently, it had not “immemorially been held in trust for the use of 
the public” for purposes of free expression.143  As a result, Internet 
access within a public library does not meet the historical confines 
standard and is thereby not a traditional public forum.144 
Similar to American Library, in Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 
the Sixth Circuit held that although certain aspects of the Internet 
conform to the definition of a traditional public forum, it has not 
“time out of mind, . . . [been] used for purposes of . . . 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”145  Consequently, despite its conforming characteristics, 
the Internet is not a public forum solely because of the historical 
confines standard.  As a result, the Internet illustrates the pitfalls 
associated with a rigid historical confines standard. 
B.  The Government-Designated Public Forum 
The second category of forums—the government-designated 
public forum—consists of property that the government explicitly 
opens to the public for expressive activity.146  Similar to traditional 
public forums, speakers may not be excluded from government-
designated public forums unless the exclusion is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.147  Furthermore, 
government-designated public forums are afforded the same 
protections regardless of whether the government voluntarily created 
 
 141  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2003). 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that “doctrines 
surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where such 
history is lacking”). 
 144  Id. 
 145  Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (finding 
that “[a]nyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of 
communication and information retrieval methods” and such discourse may be 
conducted with anyone in the world who has access to the Internet). 
 146  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 147  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
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the forum or was compelled to create the forum.148  Despite this, the 
government is not obligated to indefinitely maintain the public 
character of such forums.149 
A government-designated public forum is not formed by mere 
inaction or by allowing “limited discourse” in a particular area.150  
“Only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse” is a government-designated public forum created.151  Thus, 
in contrast to a traditional public forum, which is automatically open 
for public discourse regardless of governmental intent, a government-
designated forum is only created through a clear governmental intent 
to open property for public discourse.  Moreover, to ascertain 
whether a governmental authority specifically opened property for 
free expression, a court will look to the “policy and practice” of the 
particular agency or body.152  In addition, courts will also look to the 
nature of the property in question and its “compatibility with 
expressive activity to discern the government’s intent.”153 
An example of a government-designated public forum is seen in 
Widmar v. Vincent, where the Supreme Court held that a state 
university created a public forum when it made certain campus 
facilities available to registered student groups.154  In Widmar, the 
university unconstitutionally violated a student religious group’s First 
Amendment rights by denying them access to the university’s facilities 
based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion.155  
The Supreme Court held that the university’s policy of 
accommodating registered student group meetings evidenced a 
governmental intent to create a public forum.156  As such, the 
university was required to justify its exclusion of the religious group 
by proving that the exclusion was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.157  Ultimately, the university was 
 
 148  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)). 
 149  Id. at 46. 
 150  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–03 (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee 
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”) 
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n., 453 U.S. 114, 129 
(1981)). 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. (holding that when “the nature of the property is inconsistent with 
expressive activity,” a court is particularly reluctant to rule the government intended 
to create a public forum). 
 154  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). 
 155  Id. at 269. 
 156  Id. at 268. 
 157  Id. at 270. 
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unable to produce a compelling justification to carry this heavy 
burden.158 
In contrast, in American Library, the Supreme Court held that 
Internet access in a public library is not a designated public forum 
because a “public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order 
to create a public forum for Web publishers to express 
themselves . . . .”159  Rather, libraries provide “Internet access, not to 
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ but for the 
same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate research, 
learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of 
requisite and appropriate quality.”160  Thus, because the Supreme 
Court found that the library provided Internet access solely for 
information gathering, the library did not intend to designate its 
Internet access for expression.161  American Library is an example of 
the Court investigating the policy and practices of a governmental 
agency to ascertain an intent to create a public forum.  Ultimately, 
absent clear evidence of a governmental intent to create a public 
forum, courts will rule that a forum is nonpublic under the First 
Amendment.162 
C.  The Nonpublic Forum 
When property does not qualify as a traditional public forum or 
a government-designated public forum, the property is considered a 
nonpublic forum.163  Speech within nonpublic forums receives the 
least amount of First Amendment protection and “[a]ccess . . . can be 
restricted as long as the restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an 
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose 
the speaker’s view.’”164  In addition, an access restriction to nonpublic 
forums “need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable 
or the only reasonable limitation.”165  Furthermore, such restrictions 
may be based on “subject matter and speaker identity” so long as the 
restriction is reasonable with respect to the character of the forum 
and the restriction is viewpoint neutral.166  Thus, a speaker may not be 
 
 158  Id. 
 159  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003). 
 160  Id. at 206–07. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985). 
 163  Id. at 800. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992). 
 166  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983)). 
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excluded from a nonpublic forum merely because the government 
disagrees with his or her viewpoint on a subject that is otherwise 
appropriate within the forum.167 
Additionally, courts will look to the nature of the property in 
question to determine if it is a nonpublic forum.168  Where “the 
nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity,” a court 
is particularly reluctant to rule that the government intended to 
create a public forum.169  This rule is consistent with the idea that the 
government, like private property owners, has the right to “preserve 
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”170  Despite this, even when property is characterized as 
nonpublic it “can still serve as a forum for First Amendment 
expression if the expression is appropriate for the property . . . and is 
not incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a 
particular time.”171  This rule implies that excluding expressive activity 
that is consistent with the nature and activity of a forum is 
unreasonable. 
One example of a nonpublic forum is an airport terminal.172  In 
International Society  for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, the Supreme 
Court held that airport terminals do not constitute public forums 
because: (1) “the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate 
that airports have historically been made available for speech 
activity,” and (2) airports have not been “intentionally opened by 
their operators” for speech activity.173  Furthermore, the distribution 
of religious materials in airplane terminals, which was the challenged 
speech activity in Krishna, was inconsistent with the nature of the 
property as such distributions were likely to disrupt business by 
 
 167  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (“Although a speaker may be excluded from a 
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose 
of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial 
benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it 
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an 
otherwise includible subject.”). 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. at 803. 
 170  Krishna, 505 U.S. at 679–80. 
 171  Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 
773 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that although a Mass 
Transit Authority station is a nonpublic forum, selling newspapers through news 
racks is consistent with the normal activity of the forum and thus it is unreasonable to 
completely exclude them). 
 172  See Krishna, 505 U.S. at 681. 
 173  Id. at 680–81. 
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causing passengers an unwanted inconvenience.174  As a result, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the terminals were nonpublic forums, 
and the challenged access restrictions were subject to a 
reasonableness test.175  Applying this reasonableness test, the Supreme 
Court held that because solicitation has a disruptive effect on airport 
activities and causes unwanted passenger inconvenience, excluding 
solicitation from the forum was reasonable, and thus constitutional.176 
In essence, the nonpublic forum operates as a catchall forum 
because all types of property that do not qualify as traditional public 
forums or government-designated public forums necessarily fall into 
this category. 
D.  Beginning the Forum Analysis 
To conduct a forum analysis, the most logical starting point is 
determining the forum’s classification.  In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a 
forum does not have to be tangible property.177  Rather, a forum is 
“defined in terms of the access sought by the speaker,” and, as a 
result, a “particular channel of communication [can] constitute[] [a] 
forum for First Amendment purposes.”178  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court held that there are two types of access that speakers can seek: 
general access or limited access.179  A speaker seeks general access to 
public property when he or she attempts to utilize the entire property 
for speech purposes.180  As a result, the forum encompasses the entire 
property.181  In contrast, “[i]n cases in which limited access is sought, 
[the Supreme Court has] taken a more tailored approach to 
ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the 
government property.”182 
For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association, the speaker attempted to gain access to a public school’s 
internal mail system and the teachers’ mailboxes.183  The Supreme 
 
 174  Id. at 683. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. at 684–85. 
 177  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 183  See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983) (holding that the internal mail system was the relevant forum 
notwithstanding the fact that an internal mail system lacks physicality). 
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Court held that despite its intangible nature, the internal mailing 
system, rather than the school, was the relevant forum.184  This is an 
instance where a speaker sought limited access.185  Comparably, in 
Cornelius, the Supreme Court ruled that the Combined Federal 
Campaign (CFC), which was a charity drive aimed at federal 
employees, was the relevant forum despite the CFC’s designation as 
“a particular means of communication.”186  Similar to Perry, the Court 
took a more tailored, limited-access approach to identifying the CFC 
as the relevant forum.187 
Therefore, a court identifies a forum by determining where a 
speaker is attempting to gain access.188  In addition, it is 
inconsequential whether the speaker is attempting to gain access to 
something that is tangible or intangible.189  Finally, the scope of the 
forum ultimately depends on whether the speaker is attempting to 
gain general or limited access to the property.190  As a general rule, 
however, where a speaker attempts to access a means of 
communication, such as a social network, a court should employ a 
limited-access approach to identifying the forum.191 
E.  Application to BART 
1.  Identifying the Forum(s) 
With respect to the August 11 planned protest, it is clear that the 
flash mobbers were attempting to gain access to BART’s train 
platforms.192  This can be inferred by examining the July 11 protest, 
which used BART’s train platforms as the primary location for the 
 
 184  Id. (holding that the internal mail system was a nonpublic forum because the 
mailing system was only intended for use by the school’s faculty and staff.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs were not among the group for whose special benefit the forum was 
created). 
 185  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 
 186  Id. (finding that the CFC was a nonpublic forum because it did not meet the 
criteria for a traditional public forum or a government-designated public forum.  
The Supreme Court ruled that neither the history nor the nature of the CFC 
supported respondents’ contention that the CFC was a government-designated 
public forum); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) 
(holding that Internet access in a public library is a nonpublic forum despite the 
Internet’s intangibleness). 
 187  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. 
 192  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
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demonstration.193  While the train platforms were an obvious forum, 
BART flash mobbers also attempted to gain access to a particular 
channel of communication: BART’s wireless network and, more 
specifically, the social media networks that it enables. 
As is evident by its definition, flash mobs are intrinsically linked 
with social media.194  Thus, the success of a flash mob protest is 
contingent upon how well flash mobbers can utilize social media to 
organize and disseminate information to additional supporters.  
Consequently, BART protestors likely relied on having the ability to 
access BART’s wireless network during the planned protest.  
Although the wireless network is not tangible property like a park or 
a sidewalk, the Supreme Court has held that a means of 
communication can be a forum for First Amendment purposes.195  As 
a result, the BART situation is comparable to Cornelius and Perry, 
where the relevant forums were also intangible means of 
communication.196  As such, BART’s wireless network qualifies as a 
forum.197 
Once the forums are identified, a court must determine what 
type of access is sought: general or limited.198  BART would likely 
argue that the protestors sought general access to the property, and 
therefore, the forum encompassed BART’s train stations as a whole.  
This argument, however, is unjustified as the July 11 protest merely 
took place on BART’s train platforms.199  According to the Supreme 
Court, when a speaker seeks such limited access a court may take a 
more tailored, piecemeal approach to determining the appropriate 
forum.200  In contrast, when a speaker attempts to access a property in 
its entirety, the forum encompasses the whole property.201  
Additionally, courts generally take a tailored, limited access approach 
when a means of communication—such as BART’s wireless 
network—is implicated.202  In the instant matter, the BART protestors 
 
 193  See Silverman, supra note 12. 
 194  Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1 (a flash mob is comprised of “a group of 
people summoned (as by e-mail or text message) to a designated location at a specified 
time to perform an indicated action before dispersing”) (emphasis added). 
 195  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 
 196  Id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983); 
see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (examining whether 
the Internet is a public or nonpublic forum). 
 197  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. 
 198  Id. 
 199  See BART Letter, supra note 1077; Silverman, supra note 12. 
 200  See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. 
 201  Id. 
 202  Id. at 801–02; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
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merely attempted to access a specific location and wireless network 
within BART’s train stations.203  Consequently, the access sought was 
limited, and a court should take a tailored approach to determining 
the scope of the forum. 
Using a tailored approach, a court would certainly find that 
BART’s platform areas constitute a forum.  As for the second possible 
forum—BART’s wireless network—free speech activists may be able 
to argue that under a limited access approach, this analysis must be 
tailored even further.  During flash mobs, protestors only seek access 
to social media networks, such as instant messaging, Twitter, and 
Facebook, to disseminate information, communicate with one 
another, and recruit new supporters.204  Consequently, flash mobbers 
do not attempt to utilize most of the other functions and capabilities 
that wireless networks offer.  Thus, it is reasonable for flash mobbers 
to contend that the relevant forum is the social media networks 
within BART’s wireless network, rather than BART’s wireless network 
as a whole.  Although this is a logical argument, a court may dismiss it 
for being overly narrow.  In sum, there are likely two forums in this 
particular situation: (1) BART’s train platforms and (2) BART’s 
wireless network and/or the social media networks that it enables. 
2.  BART’s Train Platforms are Nonpublic Forums 
BART’s train platforms are likely nonpublic forums and, as a 
result, restrictions on speech in these areas are subject to a 
reasonableness test.  First, BART’s train platforms are not traditional 
public forums because the platforms’ principal purpose is to provide 
for convenient and cheap public transportation rather than the free 
exchange of ideas.205 
Moreover, BART’s train platforms are comparable to the forums 
in both Gannett v. Metropolitan Transport Authority and Krishna.  In 
Gannett, the Second Circuit ruled that the New York Mass Transit 
Authority (MTA) subway platforms were not traditional public 
forums because they were not primarily “used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.”206  Similarly, in Krishna, the Supreme Court held 
that airplane terminals are not traditional public forums because they 
 
U.S. 37 at 44 (1983). 
 203  See BART Letter, supra note 1077; Silverman, supra note 12. 
 204  Goodman, supra note 3; see also Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1. 
 205  Gannett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d. 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 206  Id. at 772 (internal quotations omitted). 
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are not traditionally made available for speech activity.207  Thus, 
because BART’s train platforms are analogous to both the MTA 
platforms in Gannett and the airport terminal in Krishna, BART’s train 
platforms would likely be denied traditional public forum status. 
In addition, there is no evidence that BART officials opened or 
designed their platforms for expression or discourse, which is 
required to establish a government-designated public forum.208  This 
is evident in BART’s explicit rules governing the time, place, and 
manner of expressive activities in their stations: 
For more than 25 years, BART has had a policy regarding 
the exercise of First Amendment free speech rights in areas 
of its stations where it can be done safely and without 
interference with BART’s primary mission of providing safe, 
efficient and reliable public transportation services.  To 
implement this policy, BART has designated the areas of its 
stations that are accessible to the general public without the 
purchase of tickets as unpaid areas that are open for 
expressive activity upon issuance of a permit subject to 
BART’s rules.  To protect public safety and provide safe and 
efficient public transportation, BART has restricted access 
to the “Paid” and “Platform” areas of its stations to BART 
station employees and ticketed passengers who are 
boarding, exiting or waiting for BART trains.209 
Thus, BART did not intentionally open its paid and platform areas 
for free expression. 
Furthermore, the character and nature of BART’s train 
platforms is not conducive to expressive activity.210  BART’s train 
platforms are intended for fast and convenient public 
transportation.211  Such objectives require that the platforms remain 
uncluttered and easily navigable so as to enable passengers to easily 
board and exit trains.212  As a result, allowing expressive activity—such 
as a flash mob protest—in these areas will likely frustrate BART’s 
purpose by creating platform congestion and unwanted 
inconveniences for BART passengers.213  Moreover, congested train 
platforms expose BART passengers and personnel to certain safety 
 
 207  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). 
 208  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 209  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 210  Gannett, 745 F.2d. at 773. 
 211  Id.; see also BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 212  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 213  Id. 
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risks.214  Consequently, as the Supreme Court held in Cornelius, where 
“the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity,” 
the Court is particularly reluctant to rule that the government 
intended to create a public forum.215  Accordingly, BART’s train 
platforms do not constitute government-designated public forums. 
Thus, the platforms fall into the catchall category: nonpublic 
forums.  As a result, any speech exclusion that BART places on its 
platforms is subject to a reasonableness test.216  Under the particular 
circumstances that BART was presented with, the shutdown of the 
wireless network, which was meant to disrupt the effectiveness of the 
planned flash mob protest, probably was reasonable as to the train 
platform forum.217 
BART officials were concerned that the planned August 11 flash 
mob protest would have detrimentally affected its commuters.218  
Using the July 11 flash mob protest as their guidepost, BART officials 
believed that the planned protest would result in partial and 
complete station closures, significant train delays, and the blocking of 
commuter access to trains.219  Comparable to Krishna, where the 
Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for airport officials to 
exclude solicitors from its terminals due to the unwanted 
inconvenience that solicitors created, BART officials were reasonable 
in attempting to minimize inconveniences on their train platforms.220  
In addition, this case is distinguishable from Gannett.221  Unlike the 
solicitation of newspapers on train platforms, which is considered 
consistent with the normal activity of that forum, a flash mob protest 
is inconsistent with the intended purpose of a train platform: the fast 
and efficient transportation of passengers.222  Therefore, because 
BART’s restriction was intended to facilitate the suppression of the 
planned flash mob, which was inconsistent with the nature of its train 
platforms, the wireless network shutdown was a reasonable tactic. 
Although shutting down wireless service is not the only 
alternative or even the most reasonable alternative to ensuring 
passenger and personnel safety, the Supreme Court does not require 
 
 214  Id. 
 215  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803–04 
(1985). 
 216  Id. at 800. 
 217  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). 
 218  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Krishna, 505 U.S. at 679–80. 
 221  Gannett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 222  Id. 
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as much.223  Under the reasonableness standard for nonpublic 
forums, a restriction “need only be reasonable; it need not be the 
most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”224  Additionally, 
the exclusions must be viewpoint-neutral.225  In this situation, 
passenger and personnel safety and convenience motivated BART’s 
wireless shutdown.226  As a result, the exclusion was not based upon 
censoring the flash mob protestors’ viewpoint.  Ultimately, BART’s 
wireless shutdown was a reasonable limitation on flash mobbers’ 
access to their train platforms, thereby making the restriction 
constitutional in this context. 
3.  Wireless and Social Media Networks are Traditional 
Public Forums 
In contrast to BART’s train platforms, BART’s wireless network 
and the social media networks that it enables are traditional public 
forums for First Amendment purposes.  The most notable counter-
argument against this categorization is that wireless technology, 
including Internet access and cell phone service, is a relatively recent 
development.227  As a result, BART would argue that wireless 
technology is not sufficiently entrenched in history to be considered 
a traditional public forum.228 
To begin, the historical confines standard should be overturned.  
Although it is questionable whether BART’s wireless network passes 
the historical confines standard, it is important to note that the 
standard is extremely unworkable and should not be treated as 
dispositive.  Since the creation of the historical confines standard in 
Forbes, the Supreme Court has applied the standard rigidly, 
maintaining that traditional public forum status will not be extended 
to those forums where such history is lacking.229  Recent 
developments in technology such as mobile social media networks, 
however, have exposed the need to abrogate this rigid and untenable 
 
 223  Krishna, 505 U.S. at 683. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) 
(citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983)). 
 226  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 227  See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) 
(rejecting “the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic 
confines”). 
 228  Id. 
 229  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (concluding that 
“doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations 
where such history is lacking”). 
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historical confines standard.  First, the historical confines standard is 
unworkable because no case law has addressed when a forum has 
been around long enough to be considered “immemorially . . . held 
in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”230  Consequently, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine when or how a forum satisfies this test.  Thus, the 
indefiniteness of the historical confines standard effectively creates 
an exclusive and unchanging category of traditional public forums—
public streets and parks.231 
Additionally, the shortcomings of the historical confines 
standard are exposed when applied to forums such as interactive 
social media networks.  Social media networks such as Facebook, 
Twitter, interactive Wikis, blogs, and instant messaging are almost 
entirely devoted to “communicating thought between citizens,” 
“discussing public questions,” and free expression in general, which 
are the primary purposes of traditional public forums.232  These social 
media networks foster an essential principle of the First Amendment 
as they strengthen public discourse by creating a generally accessible 
forum for individuals from different backgrounds and geographic 
locations to exchange their thoughts, opinions, and ideologies.  
Furthermore, with the development of 3G and 4G wireless data 
technology, which enables Internet access and social networking 
almost anywhere, individuals can perpetually access this forum and 
take part in an ongoing dialogue.233  In Putnam, the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged these benefits, finding that “[a]spects of cyberspace 
may, in fact, fit into the public forum category.”234  Over the eleven 
years since the Putnam decision, cyberspace has advanced to the point 
where these aspects have increased exponentially. 
The benefits to free speech that social networking technology 
engenders are not diminished merely because the technology was 
recently developed.  It is nearly impossible to rationalize why social 
networking technology should not be considered a public forum 
when it squarely fits into the Supreme Court’s definition of a 
traditional public forum: “traditional public fora are open for 
 
 230  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) 
(quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 231  Id. 
 232  Id. 
 233  What is 4G?, ATT.COM, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid 
=KB115943#fbid=fx5pT69BE9H (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 234  Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.”235  Thus, the 
rapid development of social networks exposes the arbitrariness of the 
historical confines standard.  Ultimately, the historical confines 
standard frustrates the central function of the forum analysis—to 
ensure that constitutionally protected speech within forums devoted 
to public discourse is adequately protected.236  As a result, 
technological innovations in communication and expression like 
social networking are not adequately protected under the current 
interpretation of the law.237 
Regardless of whether a court chooses to treat the historical 
confines standard as dispositive, there is a possibility that BART’s 
wireless network would be considered a traditional public forum 
nonetheless.  It has been nearly a decade since the Supreme Court 
last considered whether the Internet constitutes a traditional public 
forum.238  Over this time, the Internet has played an increasingly 
important role in free expression and public discourse.239  
Furthermore, the Internet was first created in 1969 and became 
widely used for personal telecommunication by the mid-1990s.240  
Thus, the Internet has now been in existence for over forty years and 
has been used for discourse and expression for nearly twenty years.241  
As a result, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Internet now 
has a sufficiently long history and association with free expression to 
satisfy the historical confines standard. 
Provided the wireless network is found to be a traditional public 
forum, the next step is to determine whether BART’s wireless 
shutdown was sufficiently justified.242  Usually, a restriction on 
traditional public forums must “serve a compelling state interest 
[that] . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”243  If the 
restriction is content-neutral and only regulates the time, place, and 
manner of the expression, however, the appropriate inquiry is 
 
 235  Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). 
 236  Perry, 460 U.S. at 44. 
 237  See generally Stacey D. Schesser, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening Public 
Spaces Online, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1791 (2006). 
 238  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 239  See generally William Fisher, Freedom of Expression on the Internet, THE BERKMAN 
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U. (June 14, 2001), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/Speech/. 
 240  West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, Internet, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/the_Internet.aspx. 
 241  Id. 
 242  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 243  Id. 
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whether the restriction was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and [left] open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”244 
To determine if a restriction is content-neutral, “the principal 
inquiry . . . in speech cases . . . is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.”245  Under this test, “[t]he government’s purpose 
is the controlling consideration.  A regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it 
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.”246  Thus, a restriction is content-based when something points 
“decisively to a motivation based on the subject matter, or content, of 
the speaker’s message.”247 
For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court 
held that a city’s “sound-amplification guideline” was not targeted at 
the message or content of an anti-racism concert.248  Rather, the 
regulation was justified because the city merely wanted to control 
noise levels and maintain the tranquil character of the city.249  The 
Supreme Court concluded that this justification was entirely 
unrelated to the content of the concert, and, as a result, was a 
content-neutral restriction.250 
Applying this to BART’s restriction, the wireless network 
shutdown was likely content-neutral.  BART’s principal motivation for 
shutting down service was to facilitate its security force’s ability to 
suppress the planned flash mob to ensure the convenience and safety 
of BART passengers.251  As a result, BART’s restriction was “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech” because 
there are no indications that BART was attempting to censor the flash 
mobbers’ message.252  Presumably, BART would have employed 
similar tactics had they been notified of a comparable protest 
expressing the opposite view.253  Moreover, the wireless network 
 
 244  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 245  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 246  Id. at 791–92 (holding that the “[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity 
is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 247   United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 248  Ward, 491 U.S. at 792. 
 249  Id. 
 250  Id. at 803. 
 251  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 252  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791–92. 
 253  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
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shutdown constitutes a time, place, and manner restriction because 
BART only shutdown wireless service to its train platforms for a 
temporary period of time.254  For instance, in many other areas of 
BART’s train stations, such as “the street level and at all above-
ground . . . stations and trackways,” wireless service was fully 
available.255  Therefore, the wireless shutdown was likely a content-
neutral time, place, and manner restriction on expression. 
To justify a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, 
the restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”256  BART’s interest in disabling its wireless network 
was primarily the safety and convenience of its passengers.257  In 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court 
held that the government has a compelling interest in preserving 
public safety.258  Because the “significant government interest” 
standard is less stringent than the compelling interest standard, 
BART’s public safety interest clearly meets this test. 
The next inquiry is whether BART’s wireless network shutdown 
was narrowly tailored to serve its significant government interest in 
passenger safety.  For content-neutral regulations, “[a] statute is 
narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact 
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”259  “A complete ban can be 
narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s 
scope is an appropriately targeted evil.”260  For example, in Members of 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a 
regulation that proscribed all signs on public property because the 
government had a significant interest in maintaining the aesthetic 
nature of such property.261  As a result, the proscription was justified 
because it only restricted the type of speech that it was designed to 
prevent.262 
BART’s wireless network shutdown was a complete proscription 
as it completely excluded all speech in the wireless network forum.263  
Thus, for BART to adequately justify its actions, the shutdown cannot 
 
 254  Id. 
 255  Id. 
 256  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 257  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 258  Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989). 
 259  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
 260  Id. 
 261  Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984). 
 262  Id. 
 263  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
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restrict more speech than it was designed to prevent.264  Once again, 
BART’s motive for instituting the wireless network shutdown is 
crucial to this analysis.  BART’s reason for shutting down its wireless 
network was to disrupt communication between flash mobbers once 
they were on the train platforms.265  Specifically, BART attempted to 
restrict speech relaying information regarding police locations and 
response time as well as speech aimed at recruiting and bolstering 
support for the flash mob.266  The scope of BART’s restriction, 
however, was far more expansive, as it censored any and all speech 
within the wireless network forum.  Thus, the wireless network 
shutdown fails the narrowly tailored prong of the test because the 
restriction limited considerably more expression than it was meant to 
preclude. 
In addition, BART’s restriction did not leave ample alternative 
channels of communication open.  The constitutionality of a 
regulation or restriction depends on whether it allows for alternate 
avenues of communication.267  In the instant case, BART’s wholesale 
wireless shutdown completely prevented all avenues of 
communication within the wireless network forum.268  BART would 
likely argue that it provided other avenues of communication, 
including access to passenger courtesy phones, which are located in 
the platform area.269  These phones provide “direct communication 
with Station Agents.”270  In addition, BART would likely assert that it 
provided for two intercoms on each car, which allow passengers to 
contact BART personnel for assistance while on trains.271  Although 
the courtesy phones and train intercoms constitute mediums for 
communication, they are not suitable avenues for expressive 
speech.272  As a result, these substitutes are not an adequate 
alternative to the wireless network, which provides access to an 
everlasting dialogue committed to the free flow of ideas and 
expression. 
 
 264  Id. 
 265  Id. 
 266  Id. 
 267  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802–03 (1989). 
 268  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Id. 
 271  Id. 
 272  The courtesy phones and train intercoms are not suitable for expressive 
speech because they are only used to communicate problems and concerns to BART 
employees.  Thus, these mediums do not reach a wide audience and are not 
provided to bolster the spread of ideas. 
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Ultimately, although BART’s wireless network shutdown served a 
significant government interest (public safety), the complete 
proscription on speech within the wireless network forum was not 
narrowly tailored and did not provide for ample alternative means of 
communication.273  As a result, the wireless network shutdown would 
likely be ruled unconstitutional. 
If a court refuses to extend traditional public forum status to 
BART’s wireless network, it will probably be considered a nonpublic 
forum.  Although the wireless network enables public discourse and 
allows for free expression, there is no evidence that BART 
intentionally opened its wireless network for expressive speech.  
Similar to American Library, where the Supreme Court found that a 
public library’s Internet access was intended to facilitate information 
gathering rather than free expression, BART provides wireless service 
to its platform areas for passenger convenience and safety.274  Thus, 
comparable to American Library, a court would most likely rule that 
BART’s wireless network is a nonpublic forum.  Despite this, if BART 
intended for its wireless network to ensure passenger safety, there is a 
peculiar contradiction: BART both provided and shut down its 
wireless network for safety purposes.  Such a glaring inconsistency 
may cut against the reasonableness of BART’s actions.  Nonetheless, a 
court would likely follow the same reasoning outlined in this 
Comment in Part III.E.2, and hold that the wireless network 
shutdown was a reasonable restriction on expression. 
Nevertheless, wireless and social media networks should be 
considered traditional public forums.  If the Supreme Court decides 
to adopt this view, speech within these forums will receive the utmost 
protection under the First Amendment.  Consequently, flash mob 
protests will reap the benefits of such a designation. 
IV.  PRIOR RESTRAINTS ANALYSIS 
Courts must also consider unconstitutional prior restraints on 
speech when analyzing social media restrictions during flash mob 
protests.  The Supreme Court has defined a prior restraint as an 
“administrative and judicial order forbidding certain communications 
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to 
occur.”275  Because prior restraints punish speech before the speech 
 
 273  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 274  Id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2003). 
 275  Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993); see also Bradburn v. N. 
Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 231 P.3d 166, 173 (Wash. 2010) (defining a prior restraint 
as a “restriction imposed on speech or another form of expression” before its 
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has occurred, they are greatly disfavored by the courts, and are 
thereby presumptively unconstitutional.276  In fact, in Nebraska Press 
Ass’n v. Stuart, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he thread running 
through all [prior restraint] cases is that prior restraints on speech 
are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights.”277  In addition, the temporary nature of a prior 
restraint does not make the restraint any less offensive to the First 
Amendment.278 
Before conducting a prior-restraints analysis, it is important to 
understand the difference between a prior restraint and a subsequent 
punishment.  For example, in Alexander v. United States, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a court-ordered forfeiture of funds was not a prior 
restraint on speech because the order constituted a punishment for 
the defendant’s past illegal acts.279  In response to this, the defendant 
argued that the court order operated as a prior restraint because it 
precluded his entry into the adult entertainment business.280  The 
Supreme Court dismissed this claim, holding that the order did not 
prevent the defendant from using untainted assets to finance his 
entry into the prospective field.281  Thus, because the order merely 
called for the seizure of the defendant’s tainted assets, it operated as 
a subsequent punishment for the defendant’s past wrongful acts 
rather than a prior restraint on his forthcoming speech.282 
Once it is determined that a speech restriction operates as a 
 
occurrence.  Prior restraints prevent future speech rather than punishing speech 
that has already occurred). 
 276  Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–59 (1976); see also Bantum 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of 
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity.”).  See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (finding 
that the government did not adequately justify preemptively enjoining a new paper 
publication of classified historical study on Vietnam policy); Martin H. Redish, The 
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 
(1984). 
 277  Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 393 n.25 (1979) (holding that eliminating prior restraints is a “chief purpose” of 
the First Amendment); Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a 
Complete Definition of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1097–98 (2001). 
 278  Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550; see also Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559 (ruling that 
“the burden on the Government is not reduced by the temporary nature of a 
restraint”). 
 279  Alexander, 509 U.S. at 551. 
 280  Id. 
 281  Id. (holding that the statute did not deprive the defendant from engaging in 
expressive activities; the order only restricted which assets the defendant could use to 
fund his entry into the adult entertainment industry). 
 282  Id. 
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prior restraint, a court must determine whether the restraint is 
justified.283  Governments may justify a prior restraint by 
demonstrating that the First Amendment does not protect the 
restricted speech.284  To meet this exception, a flash mob protest must 
fail to convey a message that is likely to be understood by the 
audience.285  An example of such a flash mob is a flash robbery.286  If 
the government fails to prove that the speech falls outside the 
protections of the First Amendment, then the Supreme Court applies 
the following three-prong test to determine whether the prior 
restraint is justified: (1) the nature of the speech in question must be 
likely to impair the rights of others; (2) there cannot be alternative 
measures that may mitigate the anticipated harm associated with 
allowing the speech; and (3) the prior restraint must be an effective 
recourse to preventing the threatened danger.287  Although originally 
tailored to address prior restraints on news publications, the court 
can easily apply the test to flash mob protests. 
The first prong of this test may be satisfied even if it is 
speculative whether the rights of others will be impaired by the 
speech.288  But the conclusion that the rights of others may be 
impaired must be reasonable.289  For example, in Nebraska Press, the 
Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for the judge to conclude 
that “pervasive pretrial publicity” of an impending case may impair 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.290  Although such harm was 
speculative, the Supreme Court held that the judge’s “conclusion as 
to the impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity 
speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and 
unknowable.”291  Therefore, the judge’s temporary injunction on 
pretrial news coverage satisfied the first prong of the test.292 
The second prong of the test asks whether there were any 
alternatives that could have mitigated the harm associated with the 
 
 283  Nebraska Press, 427 at 558 (holding that the government “carries a heavy 
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint”). 
 284  United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Nebraska 
Press, 427 U.S. at 562). 
 285  See supra Part II.A. 
 286  Shayon, supra note 6. 
 287  Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 310–11 (citing Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562). 
 288  Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562–63. 
 289  Id. 
 290  Id. 
 291  Id. at 563. 
 292  Id.  
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particular speech.293  In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court found that 
there were numerous viable alternatives to altogether enjoining 
pretrial news coverage.294  Such alternatives included postponing the 
trial, moving the trial to a less exposed venue, and clearly and 
emphatically instructing the jurors of their duties.295  The Supreme 
Court ruled that the Government did not adequately refute these 
alternatives because there was no finding that the alternatives “would 
not have protected [the defendant’s] rights.”296  This analysis 
illustrates that the party seeking to enforce the prior restraint bears 
the burden of disproving the efficacy of possible alternative 
measures.297 
The last prong of the Nebraska Press test examines whether the 
prior restraint will effectively prevent the threatened danger.298  In 
analyzing the third prong in Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court 
examined the location of the trial, most notably the size of the 
community.299  Due to the community’s small size, the Supreme Court 
concluded that rumors and information concerning the defendant’s 
trial likely would have permeated the town regardless of whether 
there were any news accounts being printed or broadcast.300  Thus, 
because certain facts of the case would likely surface irrespective of 
the pretrial news coverage, the restriction on news publication was 
not an effective means of restraining a community from discussing 
the facts of the trial.301  Ultimately, Nebraska Press embodies how much 
courts disfavor anticipatory restraints on speech.  As a result, 
authorities that preemptively restrict flash mob protests will likely 
have an extremely difficult time justifying their actions. 
A.  BART’s Wireless Network Shutdown Qualifies as an Unjustified 
Prior Restraint 
BART’s wireless network shutdown strongly resembles a prior 
restraint because, on its face, the shutdown appears to restrict speech 
“in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”302 
 
 293  Id. 
 294  Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563–65. 
 295  Id. at 563–64. 
 296  Id. at 565. 
 297  Id. at 562–63. 
 298  United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 311 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 299  Nebraksa Press, 427 U.S. at 567 (noting that the community had roughly 850 
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 300  Id. 
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 302  Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (internal quotations 
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BART could argue that the wireless network shutdown is 
comparable to Alexander, where the Supreme Court found no prior 
restraint because the injunction did not restrict the defendant from 
engaging in the expressive activity he desired.303  Rather, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the order was a subsequent punishment that limited 
the type of funds that the defendant could use to finance his entry 
into the adult entertainment industry.304 
BART’s wireless network shutdown, however, is distinguishable 
from Alexander.  First, BART’s wireless network shutdown did not 
constitute a subsequent punishment for the July 11 protest.  There 
was never an official finding that the July 11 protest required or 
deserved reprisal.  Although BART publically condemned the July 11 
protest, no arrests were ever made regarding whether the protest 
warranted punishment.305  In addition, the wireless network shutdown 
does not fit the characteristics of a punishment.  The shutdown was 
grossly overbroad as it “punished” numerous people who fall outside 
the class of alleged transgressors.306  To illustrate, the shutdown 
punished everyone on BART’s train platforms regardless of whether 
they participated in the July 11 protest.307  Secondly, BART’s alleged 
punishment sought to reprimand an unidentifiable group of 
individuals.  Because BART did not possess a definitive list of people 
who participated in the July 11 protest, it was impossible to direct a 
punishment strictly toward flash mobbers.  Moreover, the wireless 
network shutdown was not an effective punishment because it did not 
prevent or deter the type of behavior it sought to punish—the 
endangerment of BART passengers.308  Although a wireless network 
shutdown can limit the effectiveness of perpetuating a flash mob 
protest, it is arguably not meant to prevent a protest from occurring.  
While the August 11 planned protest did not materialize, it is 
unreasonable to believe the shutdown was the sole reason.  As a 
result, the wireless shutdown does not constitute a subsequent 
punishment because (1) there was never a determination that the 
July 11 protest warranted retribution, and (2) the shutdown does not 
meet the criteria of a punishment. 
In addition, BART could contend that the wireless shutdown was 
 
omitted). 
 303  Id. at 550–51. 
 304  Id. at 551. 
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 306  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 307  Id. 
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similar to Alexander in that it did not restrain the flash mobbers from 
speaking out against BART; it merely restricted where they could 
protest.  This argument fails because the primary purpose of the 
wireless network shutdown was to restrict flash mobbers’ access to 
BART’s wireless network rather than the train platforms.309  BART’s 
letter to its passengers on August 20, 2011 is evidence of this purpose: 
The August 10 intelligence revealed that the individuals 
would be giving and receiving instructions to coordinate 
their activities via cell phone after their arrival on the train 
platforms at more than one station.  Individuals were 
instructed to text the location of police officers so that the 
organizers would be aware of officer locations and response 
times.  The overall information about the planned protest 
led BART to conclude that the planned action constituted a 
serious and imminent threat to the safety of BART 
passengers and personnel . . . .310 
As a result, BART fully expected the August 11 flash mob to take 
place.  Thus, the primary purpose for the wireless network shutdown 
was to disrupt the communication of protestors once they were on 
the platform, not to restrict the protestors’ access to the platform.311  
Consequently, this case is distinguishable from Alexander because 
BART, motivated by speculative “intelligence,” attempted to restrict 
speech that had not yet occurred by disabling its wireless network. 
Since the wireless network shutdown constituted a prior restraint 
and the August 11 flash mob protest qualifies as protected expressive 
conduct, a court should apply the Nebraska Press three-pronged test.312  
The first prong of the Nebraska Press test asks whether the nature of 
the speech in question is likely to impair the rights of others.313  BART 
likely satisfies this prong as it is reasonable to believe that the August 
11 protest would cause significant congestion on BART’s train 
platforms.314  Additionally, such congestion could lead to possible 
safety problems.315  Although this fear is speculative, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that reasonable speculation does not defeat the first 
prong of the Nebraska Press test.316 
 
 309  Id. 
 310  Id.  
 311  See BART Letter, supra note 1077. 
 312   United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310–11 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 
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The second prong of the Nebraska Press test inquires as to 
whether there are any other measures that may mitigate the harm 
associated with allowing the speech.317  As applied to the BART 
situation, BART would have the burden of proving that there are no 
less restrictive alternatives to ensuring passenger safety.318  One 
possible alternative to the wireless shutdown was to increase security 
in the platform areas.  In response to this, BART would likely assert 
that it increased security by 120 extra uniformed officers.319  To carry 
its burden, BART would have to demonstrate that an increase in 
security alone was inadequate to protect its passengers and 
personnel.320  This is not easy to prove because it is reasonable to 
believe that employing ample security would mitigate the detrimental 
effects of protestors using social media to perpetuate the flash mob.321  
As a result, a wireless network shutdown would only marginally help 
BART officers suppress the flash mob, making the tactic largely 
unnecessary. 
Though extreme, a second possible alternative would be to 
temporarily restrict all passengers from the platform areas.  A court 
would likely hold that this tactic is unreasonable because the flash 
mob was scheduled to occur during afternoon rush hour.  Ultimately, 
however, BART would encounter much difficulty in attempting to 
carry its burden and would likely fail the second prong. 
Furthermore, BART would also have trouble satisfying the third 
prong of the Nebraska Press test, which questions “the probable 
efficacy of a prior restraint” to prevent the threatened danger.322  
Shutting down wireless service is not an effective way of ensuring 
public safety because it does not adequately safeguard against a flash 
mob protest actually occurring.  As a result, the safety of BART 
passengers and personnel would be endangered notwithstanding the 
wireless network shutdown.  Although a court would now have the 
benefit of hindsight and know that the August 11 planned protest did 
not take place, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the wireless 
network shutdown was the only reason for this.  As mentioned above, 
disabling wireless service was primarily intended to disrupt the 
protestors’ communication during the protest.323  This restriction in 
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no way affects the organization or planning of the flash mob.  Thus, a 
wireless network shutdown merely disturbs how effectively a protest is 
carried out.  As a result, irrespective of the wireless network 
shutdown, BART’s train platforms were likely to be extremely 
congested, thereby manifesting the danger BART sought to avoid.  
BART would likely contend that the wireless network shutdown 
mitigated these dangers by aiding security’s ability to suppress the 
flash mob.  Despite this, a wireless network shutdown does not 
adequately “prevent the threatened danger” because passenger safety 
is no less vulnerable as a result. 
Ultimately, BART would most likely fail to carry its burden, 
rendering the wireless network shutdown unconstitutional under the 
Nebraska Press test.  Therefore, the BART situation demonstrates that 
governmental agencies that institute anticipatory restrictions on flash 
mob protests, most notably restrictions on social media access, likely 
will fail the Supreme Court’s rigorous prior restraint test. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Not all flash mobs receive First Amendment protections.324  To 
receive constitutional protection, a flash mob must attempt to express 
a message that is likely to be understood by those who view it.325  As a 
result, flash mobs such as flash robberies will not receive 
constitutional protection because they do not convey a message.  
Flash mob protests, on the other hand, almost always aim to convey a 
message, and, thus, will generally be entitled to receive some First 
Amendment protection.326 
Despite this, the government has more leeway in restricting 
expressive conduct.327  Therefore, in examining the constitutionality 
of restrictions on flash mob protests, one must determine the flash 
mob’s speech and “nonspeech” elements.328  Once these are 
determined, courts will examine whether the governmental 
restriction on the flash mob is intended to regulate the protest’s 
communicative elements.329  In the event that the restriction is 
intended to restrain the nonspeech elements of the flash mob, the 
government’s interest in restraining those elements must outweigh 
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any incidental impingements on the speaker’s protected expressive 
message.330  Ultimately, because the O’Brien test is extremely fact-
sensitive, there is no bright-line rule stating whether a restriction on a 
flash mob protest violates the First Amendment.331  Thus, flash mob 
protests must be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, because flash mob protests almost always attempt 
to access wireless and social media networks,332 flash mob protests 
should receive the protections of traditional public forums.  
Although a court has yet to rule that wireless networks constitute 
traditional public forums,333 the BART situation embodies why 
wireless and social media networks deserve the utmost protection 
under the First Amendment.  Thus, this Comment recommends that 
courts downgrade the historical confines doctrine334 from a dispositive 
standard to a merely persuasive factor.  Ultimately, under this 
proposed construction, limitations on a flash mob protests’ access to 
social media networks should only be permissible in the most 
extraordinary of circumstances. 
Lastly, prior restraints on flash mob protests must rebut an 
extremely heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, especially when 
that restriction attempts to limit a flash mob protests’ access to social 
media.335  As a result, unless the prior restraint is associated with an 
important governmental interest, a court would likely find that the 
restriction is unconstitutional.336  Ultimately, if a flash mob protest is 
entitled to First Amendment protection, its fundamental relationship 
to social media will likely be its greatest defense against governmental 
restrictions. 
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